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NOTES
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE AND FEDERAL
OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The congressional power to establish and regulate the mails is
derived from article I, section 8, clause 7 of the Constitution which
states simply that Congress shall have the power "To establish Post
Offices and post Roads." More than one thousand postal inspectorse
are employed to enforce the wide spectrum of laws which have been
enacted under this grant of power to assure the smooth and safe
distribution of the mail.2 Approximately six percent of the yearly
arrests made by postal inspectors are for violations of 18 U.S.C.
section 14613 which prohibits sending obscene material through the
mail.4 For fiscal year 1964, the arrests and prosecutions made by
federal officials in cooperation with state officials, and prosecutions
by United States attorneys under this statute totaled 805, resulting in
627 convictions; for the first six months of fiscal 1965 there were
427 arrests, resulting in 326 convictions.; It has been estimated that
fifty percent of the criminal prosecutions for violation of section 1461
involve more or less private mailings of homemade pornography or
obscene letters, as opposed to commercial mailings of obscene ma-
1 Hearings on Invasions of Privacy (Goverment Agencies) Before the Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 66.
2 Crimes relating to the Postal Service are codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1734 and
range from destruction of letter boxes or mail to falsely labeling vehicles as carriers.
3 Hearings on Invasions of Privacy, supra note 1, at 66, 171.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), reads in part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance; and -...
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where,
or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters ...
may be obtained ...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails
or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails,
or delivery or anything declared by this section to be nonmailable . . . or
knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating
or depositing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both, for the first such offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense there-
after.
5 Hearings on Invasions of Privacy, supra note 1, at 171.
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terials.6 Some of these prosecutions are undoubtedly aimed at persons
who, in many cases, have sent "hate" or "crank" mail indiscrim-
inately to innocent or nonconsenting parties. However, people have
been and are now being prosecuted for sending private letters to
consenting adults if these letters contain obscene material. A question
arises as to whether or not the latter type of activity is that which
section 1461 seeks to curtail.
Through an analysis of legislative history, case history, and recent
opinions of the Supreme Court, the writers will endeavor to support
the proposition that private correspondence between consenting
parties, whether "obscene" or not, is outside the scope of the ob-
scenity statute.7
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Historically, criminal obscenity was an outgrowth of that group of
crimes which involved conduct that affronted the public, such as
indecent exposure or public drunkenness. The first obscenity prosecu-
tion was aimed at conduct of this type, but was followed soon after-
wards by prosecutions for obscene libel. While this early develop-
ment was heavily influenced by religious considerations, there
6 Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Fed-
eral Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. R.v. 214, 237 n.60 (1957).
7 While recognizing that peripheral to the discussion contained in this article is the
jurisprudential question of the state's role in the enforcement of morals, this note takes
the position that the basis of the obscenity law has shifted from its religious or moral-
istic beginnings to a more utilitarian approach. But see Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex
Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46
MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1037-38 (1962). This is in direct opposition to the preliminary
position taken by Professor Henkin who states, "I believe . . . that obscenity laws are
not principally motivated by any conviction that obscene materials inspire sexual of-
fenses. Obscenity laws, rather, are based on traditional notions, rooted in this country's
religious antecedents, of governmental responsibility for communal and individual 'de-
cency' and 'morality.'" Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963). Concluding that the current impetus behind the federal
obscenity statute is not moralistic, but rather functional, avoids the involved philosoph-
ical, and at times almost esoteric, controversy currently going on in this area. See gen-
erally, HAIRT, LAW LIBERTY, AND MoRA.rrY (1963); DEvLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS (1959); Devlin, Law, Democracy and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 635
(1962); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986
(1966). The writers prefer to demonstrate adequate support for the proposition that
"in this field, [the law's function is] . . . to preserve public order ... to protect the
citizen from what is ... injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploita-
tion . . . of others .... " Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and
Prostitution, CmD. No. 247 at 9-10 (1957). While Professor Henkin would probably
concur in this article's conclusion-the exclusion of private correspondence between
consenting adults from the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1461-he takes the "high road" and
we take the "low road."
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gradually began to emerge a more acceptable goal than the protec-
tion of the Church against blasphemy.
This emerging goal was the protection of youth against writings
thought to be harmful to their healthy development. More broadly,
this goal could be described as a desire to suppress that type of
writing which has a causal relationship to crime and juvenile
delinquency. More recently, there has been expressed a desire to
prevent the commercial exploitation of the psychosexual tensions
engendered by the conflict between normal sex drives and curiosity
of the individual, and the social and legal restraints on overt sexual
behavior. While this psychosexual tension is to a certain extent found
in ev-eryone, it is probably most pronounced in the young.8
To summarize briefly, from the legislative history of obscenity
legislation, three considerations will appear paramount in determin-
ing whether a writing should be suppressed on the grounds that it is
obscene: (1) whether the writing is made public indiscriminately so
as to affront or annoy people; (2) if so, whether the writing is of the
type that could be causally related to antisocial behavior in the form
of crime or juvenile delinquency; and (3) whether the writing is of
a commercial nature. Once the conclusion is reached that the above
characteristics are essential to a valid prosecution under section 1461,
it is submitted that private correspondence between consenting adults
is not within the statute. Such correspondence is not commercial,
public, nor can it have an adverse effect on youth when not sent to
them. If material does have such characteristics and is sent through
first-class mail it should not be protected solely on the grounds that
it was mailed first-class rather than third-class. Nevertheless, material
which might well result in annoyance to the public or affect youth
detrimentally when indiscriminately disseminated, should not be
prosecuted under the obscenity statute, if in fact it is intended to
remain private and be read only by adults who have consented to
its receipt. Support for the above conclusion can best be demon-
strated by delving into the murky beginnings of obscenity legislation,
and following its legislative and judicial development to the present
day.
A. English Obscenity Law Prior to 1857
In tracing the development of the crime of obscenity, and ob-
scenity legislation, one discovers that the first reported obscenity case
8 Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, supra note 7, at 1035, 1040.
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was Le Roy v. Sir Charles Sidley,9 a 1663 case involving obscene
conduct rather than obscene writing. In London, Sir Charles Sedley,
emboldened by drink and completely nude, climbed onto a balcony at
"The Cock Tavern" and preached a "mountebank sermon" to a
mixed and amazed crowd, shouting that he had for sale "such power
as would cause women to ran after him." He also used profanities
unsparingly, which "aroused public indignation." The result was
that:
He was fined 2000 mark, committed without bail for a week, and
bound to his good behavior for a year, on his confession of in-
formation against him, for showing himself naked in a balkony,
and throwing down bottles (pist in) vi & armis among people in
Covent Garden, contra pacem and to the scandal of the Govern-
ment.10
In finding that Sir Sedley's conduct warranted punishment, the
court reasoned that there existed in the courts a residual power to
make criminal an act for which there was no statutory provision or
direct precedent, if such act was prejudicial to the public welfare.
This power originated in the Court of the Star Chamber, which de-
clared itself to be custodes morum, or guardian of morals. The King's
Bench gradually developed the same power, and, after the abolition
of the Court of the Star Chamber in 1641, claimed itself to be heir
to the Star Chamber as custodes morum.11 Although Sir Sedley's
conduct was unquestionably public (it had been witnessed by a
crowd of hundreds), and was a breach of the King's peace, the ele-
ments necessary for the crime of obscene conduct remained undefined.
It was not until 1708, half a century later, that the first recorded
action against an obscene writing was instigated. It proved unsuc-
cessful, however, the judge determining that where the defendant
had published an allegedly obscene book entitled The Fifteen Plagues
of a Maidenhead, there was no contravention of the common law.
Drawing a distinction between public blasphemy and printed ob-
scenity the court said:
9 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1663). There are various reports with vari-
ous spellings of the name Sedley.
10 Sir Charles Sydlye's Case, 1 Keble 620, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K.B. 1663). See
generally Alpert, judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HAv. L. REV. 40,
41-42 (1938).
11 Chandos, "My Brother's Keeper" in "To DEPRAVE AN CoRRuPT . . ." 18
(Chandos ed. 1962); Note, Courts Have Power as Custodes Morum To Punish Con-
spiracy To Do Acts Newly Defined as Corruptive of Public Morals, 75 HARv. L. REv.
1652 (1962).
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A crime that shakes religion ... as profaness on the stage, &c., is
indictable . . . ; but writing an obscene book, as that intitled
"Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead" is not indictable, but punish-
able only in the Spiritual Court .... 12
The effect of the holding was to place prosecutions for obscene
writings, as opposed to offensive public conduit, within the jurisdic-
tion of the ecclesiastical courts which customarily dealt with such
moral offenses as adultery and swearing.3 Unless the obscenity were
manifested in public conduct, the "crime" was thought to have been
against the Church, not the State.
Less than twenty years later, however, this distinction between
obscene conduct and obscene writing was obliterated. In 1725,
Richard Curl, "bookseller... printer, and pirate of literature,' 1 4 was
charged and found guilty of the common law crime of publishing
an "obscene libel" in the form of a book entitled Venus in the
Cloister, or The Nun in Her Smock.' 5
The King's Bench upheld the conviction on the grounds that:
[S]ince morality is a part of the law of the land as the Christian
religion is, an act which is destructive of morality in general, such
as an obscene libel ought to be punished in the same way as one
against the Christian Religion, such as blasphemy and libel.' 6
The judge reasoned rather circuitously that "as to morality, destroy-
ing that is destroying the peace of the Government, for the govern-
ment is no more than the publick order which is morality."' 7 By the
weight of this reasoning, the publication of an obscene writing be-
came a crime at common law. It seems that the court here was more
concerned with writing that was libelous in character, than with mere
pornography.
The first English statute proscribing obscenity was a section in the
Vagrancy Act of 1824 which forbade the exposing of an obscene
picture or print on any street or public place.' 8 Parliament had evi-
dently given legislative effect to the judiciary's practice (prior to
Rex v. Curl) of limiting the offense to some public display of the
12 The Queen v. Read, 11 Mod. 142, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (Q.B. 1708).
13 ERNST & ScHwARTz, CENsoRSmIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE 9 (1964).
14 Alpert, supra note 10, at 43.
25 ERNsT & ScHwARTz, op. cii. supra note 13, at 9.
16 Chandos, supra note 11, at 18 (quoting from Dominus Rex v. Curl).
17 Dominus Rex v. Curl, 2 Str. 788, 790, 93 Eng. Rep. 849, 850 (K.B. 1727).
18 Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, § 4. 18 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
203-04 (2d ed. Burrows ed. 1948). This section also punished fortune telling, palm.
istry, indecent exposure and carrying burglary tools.
(Vol. 4
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obscene matter. Obscenity was not yet bad per se, rather the main
concern was the effect it had on the orderly working of society. After
Rex v. Curl, but prior to 1857, there were several other prosecutions
for obscene libel'9 based on the premise that the mere publication of
obscenity was indeed a crime. However, little use seems to have been
made of the provisions of the Vagrancy Act. The holdings of the
obscenity cases decided during this period have been variously sum-
marized as showing "a strong link between the prosecution of ob-
scenity and the fear of blasphemy or sedition, mostly blasphemy" 20
or, as formulating no definition or criteria for identifying obscenity
other than the ability to smell it.21
Because the scope of criminal obscenity was vague, this evolving
common law crime, when not used as a means to secure political or
religious retribution, was generally lumped together with other af-
fronts to public decency such as indecent exposure or public drunk-
enness. It was the public outrageousness of the defendant's conduct
or writing that was sought to be curtailed.22 No distinction existed as
to which segment of the population should be protected from ob-
scenity (i.e., not only youth but also adults were sought to be pro-
tected from the public display of obscenity). Thus, obscenity legisla-
tion and case law in the American colonies, and later in the United
States, had as its beginning, common law rulings which limited
convictions to offenses of a public character. As will be seen, how-
ever, this limitation on the concept of obscenity did not impede the
later development of obscenity legislation.
B. Lord Campbell's Act and the Hicklin Case
Before crossing the Atlantic, two other modifications of the English
law should be noted. While these developments did not occur prior
to the beginnings of federal obscenity legislation in the United States,
they did influence the course of American obscenity law. The first
development was the passage of Lord Campbell's Obscene Publica-
tions Act of 1857,23 which provided that obscene publications could
19 See, e.g., Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770), which is
so heavily involved with the political situation of the time and procedural issues that it
really adds little of value to an understanding of obscene libel. See also Alpert, supra
note 10, at 44-47. In WADE & PHILLIPS, CoNSrIuIoNNAr. LAw (6th ed. 1960) 546,
the statement is made that "no case of importance seems to have been reported between
the two dates [1727-1868]."
20 ERNsT & SCHWARTrz, op. cit. supra note 13, at 9.
21 Alpert, supra note 10, at 47.
22 Paul & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 215.
23 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83; see also 145-49 Parl. Deb. (3d ser. 1857).
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be searched for, seized, and, after a hearing before justices, destroyed
if found offensive.24 Private libraries were exempted, since the law
provided that the obscene books had to be "held for sale"; only public
shops were subject to search. The intended application of the law
was conceded to be, first "to works written for the single purpose of
corrupting the morals of youth," and second, to those works of a
"nature calculated to shock the common feelings of decency."'25
Lord Campbell's Act was quite similar to the American statutes
later passed by Congress, and although the congressional debates
do not evidence a particular knowledge of the English statute, in all
likelihood, congressional draftsmen were familiar with it. Lord
Campbell's Act, in its construction foreshadowed three subtle, yet
important facets of obscenity legislation. First, prior to the act some
public exposure of the picture or book was an element of the crime.
Campbell's Act, however, by providing for the search and seizure
of obscene publications, in effect made the possession of obscene
material for sale criminal per se, irrespective of publication or distri-
bution. Second, a shift in purpose had come about. At common law,
obscenity was deemed bad because of its antisocial character, and
prosecutions were either for a breach of the peace26 or for a libelous
attack upon a socially recognized and accepted institution such as
the Church or the State.27 In contrast, Lord Campbell's Act appeared
to have as its main purpose the protection of youth rather than the
general public order. Third, it may also be noted that Lord
Campbell's Act, similar to the basic American statute, relegated the
definition of "obscenity" to judicial interpretation.
This brings us to the second significant English development. Any
discussion of English obscenity legislation would be incomplete
without considering the definition that was given by the English
courts to "obscenity." The Queen v. Hicklin,28 the landmark case
which intepreted Lord Campbell's Act and provided the basic defini-
tion of "obscenity," becomes important if one is to appreciate the
fluctuating definitions given the word "obscenity" by American courts.
In Hicklin, Henry Scott, an anti-papist, bought and distributed at
cost, a pamphlet entitled The Confessional Unmasked, Showing the
24 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 721-23 (2d ed. Burrows ed. 1948).
25 Alpert, supra note 10, at 51, n.29.
26 Le Roy v. Sidley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1663).
27 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770); Rex v. Curl, 1
Barn. 29, 94 Eng. Rep. 20 (K.B. 1727).
28 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
[Vol. 4
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Depravity of the Romish Priesthood the Iniquity of the Confessional,
and the Questions Put to Females in Confession. The pamphlet, ar-
gued the defense, was not obscene, but rather an attack on the evils
of the Catholic confessional. Benjamin Hicklin, the Recorder of
London (a judicial office), held that the pamphlet was obscene
according to the common law definition, but that it did not come
within the purview of the statute since it had not been published "for
the single purpose of corrupting the morals of youth." The prosecu-
tion appealed, and the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in reversing,
.established as a test for obscenity "whether the tendency of the
matter... is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this
sort may fall."29 This definition, in accordance with the import of
Lord Campbell's Act, effectively dispelled the implication of earlier
cases, that the writing had to be libelous, as opposed to merely
pornographic in nature. At the same time, however, Cockburn's defi-
nition exceeded the main purpose of the act (to protect youth), and
in effect, encompassed matter that might not corrupt or deprave more
mature readers. Furthermore, Cockburn's definition eliminated any
requirement that it be the defendant's intention to have this material
reach the young, since if there were any chance that the material
might reach the corruptible, it was to be circumscribed.
C. Early American Obscenity Law
The early development of the crime of obscenity in the American
colonies was essentially parallel to that in England. Prior to 1792, all
fourteen states which had ratified the Constitution had obscenity
legislation of one form or another.30 From the titles of these acts,
and from the several reported cases prosecuted under them, it appears
that, as in England, obscenity offenses in the colonies were inexorably
29 Id. at 371. Ironically, this test became known as the Hikklin rule when actually it
was opposite of Hicklin's ruling. Perhaps Hicklin is more pronounceable than Cock-
burn in this connection. The material above has been drawn from ERNST & SCHWAR-z,
CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE, 34-35 (1964); Birkett, The Changing
Law in "To DEPRAVE AND CORauPT.. ." 80 (Chandos ed. 1962); Alpert, Judicial
Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HAty. L. REv. 40, 50-53 (1938); Paul &
Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal Censor-
ship, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 214, 216 (1957). As an example to illustrate the profund in-
fluence the Hicklin test has had on American law in this area, note that in the first
obscenity case to reach the Supreme Court, the trial judge had charged the jury as fol-
lows: "The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and
corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open to such influence and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall." Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43
(1896).
30 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1956).
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linked with criminal libel, outrageous public misbehavior and blas-
phemous attacks on religion. 1
In 1842, the first federal obscenity statute was enacted as part of
a tariff act. There is no recorded discussion of the provision pro-
hibiting the "importation of all indecent and obscene prints, paint-
ings, lithographs, engravings, and transparencies .... ,, 2 Congress'
main concern was not with the obscenity provision, but with whether
the bill, a protective tariff, might work a detriment to the agrarian
South. Thus, the first federal obscenity provision became law, prac-
tically unnoticed by those who voted for its enactment.8 3 It should be
remembered that as yet, there was only a vague definition of obscenity
as we know it today; the English Hicklin decision was some twenty-
six years in the future, and there was no statutory definition.
The first federal statute concerning the mailing of obscene books
and pictures was enacted by Congress in 1865, when an amendment
was made to a federal postal appropriations bill.34 The Post Office
Department had requested a variety of amendments dealing primarily
31 See the following as cited in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 n.12
(1956): Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy, §§ 4, 5 (1737), 1 Laws of Del. 173,
174 (1797); Act for the Punishment of Profane Cursing and Swearing (1791), N.H.
laws 1792, 258; Act for Suppressing Vice and Immorality, §§ VIII, IX (1798), N.J.
Rev. Laws 329, 331 (1800) ; Act for Suppressing Immorality, § IV (1788), 2 Laws
of N.Y. 257, 258 (Jones & Varick 1777-1789); Act ... for the More Effectual Sup-
pression of Vice and Immorality, § III (1741), 1 N.C. Laws 52 (Martin Rev. 1715-
1790) ; Act to Prevent the Grievous Sins of Cursing and Swearing (1700), II Statutes
at Large of Pa. 49 (1700-1712) ; Act for the Prevention of Vice and Immorality, § II
(1794), 3 Laws of Pa. 177, 178 (1791-1802); Act for the More Effectual Suppressing
of Blasphemy and Prophaneness (1703), Laws of S.C. 4 (Grimk6 1790); Act for the
Effectual Suppression of Vice, § 1 (1792), Acts of General Assembly of Va. 286
(1794).
"As early as 1712 Massachusetts made it criminal to publish 'any filthy, obscene, or
profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon' in imitation of, or mimicking of reli-
gious services. Acts and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712), Mass.
Bay Colony Charters & Laws 399 (1814)." Roth v. United States, supra at 483. See
Commonwealth v. Tarbox, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 66 (1848); Commonwealth v. Knee-
land, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336
(1821); Quincy [Mass. 1761-1772] 258, 263-64 (Charge to Grand Jury (1768) show-
ing an awareness of the Wilkes and Curl cases).
32 Act of August 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566. The act was entitled "An act
to provide revenue from imports and to ... modify existing laws imposing duties on
imports... Act of August 30, 1842, supra at 548.
33 The further discussion of the prohibition on importing obscene literature only inci-
dentally concerns us. The statute was amended in 1857, enlarging its scope to include
"articles," "images," "figures," and "photographs" (Act of March 2, 1857, ch. 63,
11 Stat. 168) ; amended again in 1890 to include obscene "books, pamphlets, paper or
writings .... " (Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1244, § 11, 26 Stat. 614); and is now in-
corporated in 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1964), and 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305
(1958).
34 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 507.
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with matters of administration, and in reply to this request a bill was
introduced in the Senate by Jacob Collamer of Vermont. 5 Evidently,
during committee discussion, mention was made of the problem of
obscene material being sent in the mail from New York to men in
the Union Army, and an amendment was suggested which would
remedy this situation.3 6 Due to proposed reconstruction legislation,
and other pressing matters, Collamer experienced difficulty introduc-
ing the bill. Most of what little discussion there was on the obscenity
section occurred on February 8, 1865, as follows:
COLLAMER: This new section may perhaps well daim some
attention, and it may be liable to some objection .... I am not
perhaps entirely satisfied with it. It is said that our mails are made
the vehicle for the conveyance of great numbers and quantities of
obscene books and pictures . . . and that is getting to be a very
great evil. This section is drawn with a view to prevent that.
JOHNSON: If they [obscene pictures and books] are sent in
envelopes, how does the postmaster know what they are?
COLLAMER: Printed publications are always sent open at one
end. It will not require the breaking of seals.
JOHNSON: You do not propose to let the postmaster break the
seals ?
COLLAMER: There is not a word said about "seals" in the
section. If gentlemen are not satisfied.., that part of the section
[authorizing postmasters to throw out obscene publications] can
be stricken out; and I take it the objection would be mainly that it
might be made a precedent for undertaking to give him [post-
master] a sort of censorship over the mails . . . . If it is thought
that it may furnish a bad precedent to that extent, the first clause
of the section may be stricken out, and then the amendment will
merely make it penal for anybody to deposit such matter in the
mails ...
JOHNSON: I move to strike out the first dause. The precedent
is a bad one, I think. . . . It is true that most of the printed matter
that is sent is sent without being covered or sealed up; but if there
is any danger of this kind those who send this species of publica-
tions will no doubt begin to seal them, and then the postmaster,
whenever he suspects that the envelope contains anything which is
obnoxious to objection, will break the seal. It does not appear to
me at all necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose .... 3
35 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 450, 654, 660-62 (1865).
86 Paul, The Post Oflce and Nonmailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 44, 47 (1961).
37 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 35, at 660-61.
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Consequently the words "all... obscene publications... discovered
in the mails shall be seized and destroyed... as the Postmaster Gen-
eral shall direct.. ." were omitted.
In this form the bill passed the House and, the first federal obscene
mail statute was enacted 38-- an amendment to an appropriation bill,
with no House, and little Senate debate. It was passed with no dis-
cussion as to its merits, and no definition of obscenity.89
While it may be unclear from the dearth of general debate on the
bill just what the aim of Congress was, it is certainly clear that Con-
gress did not intend to grant the post office anything resembling a
censorship or custos morum power. The Senators' primary concern
was to insure that there would be no invasion of first-class mail. Since
the statute speaks of publications, it may be inferred that Congress
had the commercial pornographer in mind. °
38 Act of March 3, 1865, supra note 34. This statute reads as follows:
[N]o obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, or other publication of a vulgar
and indecent character, shall be admitted into the mails of the United States;
any person or persons who shall deposit or cause to be deposited, in any post
office or branch post office of the United States, for mailing or for delivery,
an obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print or other publication, knowing the
same to be of vulgar and indecent character, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and being duly convicted thereof, shall for every such offense be
fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both, according to the circumstances and aggravations of the offense.
39 Paul, supra note 36, at 51.
40 The postal laws were codified in 1872 and a provision was added to prohibit
obscene matter on the outside of envelopes or on postcards. Act of June 8, 1872, ch.
335, § 148, 17 Stat. 302. No recorded debate is discoverable for this addition. CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 71, 4091-92 (1872). This is mentioned primarily to
establish that the acts of 1865 and 1872 were concerned only with obscene material
which was exposed to public view, and further, to show that both statutes carried an
implied, but strong, inference of noninterference with obscene matter in first-class or
sealed envelopes. This statute, which in part is now 18 U.S.C. § 1463 (1964), orig-
inally prohibited deposit or carriage in the mall of "any letter upon the envelope of
which, or postal card upon which scurrilous epithets may have been written or printed,
or disloyal devices printed or engraved ...." It was amended in 1873, to delete the
phrase "disloyal devices." Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599. Thus modi-
fied, the statute was carried into the Revised Statutes as section 3893. The phrase
"lewd, obscene or lacivious delineations ...terms or language . . ." broadened the
scope of the statute in 1876 (Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90), and then
the section was again amended in 1888 to read that "all matter otherwise mailable by
law, upon the envelope or outside cover or wrapper of which, or postal card, upon
which indecent, lewd, lascivious, obscene, libelous, scurrilous or threatening . . ."
writing appeared, would be nonmailable. Act of June 18, 1888, ch. 394, § 2, 25 Stat.
188. Less than three months later the statute was again amended by the additional pro-
hibition of matter "defamatory" or "calculated by the terms or manner or style of dis-
play and obviously intended to reflect upon the character or conduct of another ...
Act of September 26, 1888, ch. 1039, 25 Stat. 496. The last change in this area came
in 1948 when ". . . libelous, scurrilous, defamatory or threatening character . . ." was
deleted, thus confining the section primarily to a prohibition of "indecent, lewd,
lascivious, or obscene . . ." writing on postcards or envelopes. 18 U.S.C. § 1463
(1964). Language of a libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, or threatening character was
incorporated in a separate section. 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1964).
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D. The Comstock Act of 1873
The stage was now set for perhaps the most effective one-man
lobbyist movement in congressional history. Anthony Comstock went
to Congress in 1873 to lobby for what he called "his bill" and which
indeed did come to be known as the Comstock Act.41 Comstock's
avowed purpose was to persuade Congress to broaden the postal law
so as to outlaw everything obscene or immoral, articles as well as
books, from the mails. All Anthony Comstock needed was a stronger
law, and he would do the rest necessary to do away with, as he termed
it, the "hydra-headed monster" of obscenity.42
Sponsored by Senator Buckingham of Connecticut, the bill was
reported with unanimous recommendation from the Committee on
Post Offices and Post Roads. However, when the bill reached the
Senate floor, its contents were seriously questioned. It appeared that
many Senators knew little or nothing about the bill's provisions. As
Senator Conkling of New York explained:
[A]Ithough I have tried to acquaint myself with it [the Comstock
Act], I have not been able to tell, either from the reading of ap-
parently illegible manuscript . .. or from private information
gathered at the moment, and if I were to be questioned now as
to what this bill contains, I could not aver anything certain with
regard to it. The indignation and disgust which everybody feels
in reference to the acts which are here aimed at may possibly lead
us to do something which, when we come to see it in print, will not
be the thing we would have done if we had understood it and were
more deliberate about it43
Consequently, the bill was deferred, coming before the Senate three
days later on February 1, 1873, when it was passed over because of
pressing debate on a postal appropriations bill.44 The Comstock bill
was finally interjected during further debates on the appropriations
bill that evening, when a number of the Senators were pressing for
41 Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598. Anthony Comstock's activity in the
suppression of vice in the cities of New York and New Haven is interestingly de-
scribed by him in a letter to Congressman Merriam dated January 18, 1873: "These I
have seized and destroyed-obscene photographs, stereoscopic and other pictures, more
than 182,000; obscene books and pamphlets, more than 5 tons; . . .stereotype plates
for printing obscene books, more than 5 tons; ... arrest of dealers since October 9,
1871, over 50; publishers, manufacturers and dealers dead since March last, 6." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., App. 168-69 (1873).
42 For additional information on Mr. Comstock see the following, and citations
therein: PAUL & SCHWARz, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP 18-24 (1961); Paul, The Post
Office and Nonmailability of Obscenity, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 44, 51-57, & n.39 (1961).
43 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1524-25 (1873).
44 Id. at 1563.
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adjournment. This time the bill was summarily passed without
debate.4 5
There was no debate in the House either, where the bill passed
despite thirty-seven votes against it. In the closing minutes of the
March 1st session,40 after several motions to adjourn had been made
due to the lateness of the hour and the drowsiness of the Representa-
tives, the House finally approved the Comstock bill. Representative
Kerr of Indiana had made a motion to send the bill to the Committee
on the Judiciary since, "its provisions are extremely important and
they ought not to be passed in such hot haste."' 7 This motion was
narrowly defeated, however, and the bill passed despite the mis-
givings of a substantial number of congressmen.
In this manner the United States Congress enacted, with a minimal
amount of debate, a broadened and omnibus obscenity statute.48 It
was a poorly drafted statute, one which gave no definition of the
material it sought to prohibit from the mail. 9
E. Federal Legislation 1873 to 1909
1. f°qriting".
In December of 1873, the Comstock Act became section 3893 of
the Revised Statutes; three years later it was amended slightly, osten-
sibly to broaden its coverage. 0 Representative Cannon of Illinois
introduced the bill in the House and stated that, in his opinion, replac-
ing the phrase "no obscene" with "every obscene" did not "materially
change the [section] ... of the Revised Statutes .... Section 3893
of the Revised Statutes is perfected by the bill so as to provide a com-
plete penalty for the mailing of all kinds of matter therein prohibited
to pass through the mails." 51 When the House bill reached the
Senate, however, Senator Hamlin of Texas, seemingly on the spur
45 Id. at 1571.
46 Actually, the bill passed on Sunday, March 2, 1873 at about 1:30 a.m., the clock
having been stopped at midnight to preserve the fiction of passage on a business day.
47 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 43, at 2005.
48 Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598.
49 Anthony Comstock was ecstatic, and wrote in his diary: "0 how can I express
the joy of my Soul or speak the mercy of God ...." Mr. Comstock stayed in Wash-
ington for the inauguration ceremony, and was made a "special agent" for the Post
Office Department by President Grant. PAUL & ScHiWARTnz, op. cit. supra note 42, at
24. After less than one year, Comstock was able to say of his activities that he had
seized 194,000 obscene pictures and photographs, 134,000 pounds of books, and about
60,300 rubber articles. ERNST & SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 13, at 33.
50 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90.
51 4 CONG. REC. 3656 (1876).
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of the moment, suggested an amendment that was to bother the
federal courts for the next decade. "I move an amendment in the
first section of the bill .... [T]o strike out 'picture-paper,' which
is a compound word, and insert the words 'picture, paper, writ-
ing'.5...2 The only question raised on this proposed amendment
was whether it was to read "paper-writing" or "paper, writing." It
was quickly determined that the latter form was correct, and the
amendment passed. While most of the debate on the bill centered on
a provision concerned with the mailing of lottery tickets, Senator
Morton of Indiana voiced concern with the scope of the bill, thereby
demonstrating the first congressional recognition of the difficulty,
and necessity, of determining obscenity standards.
Mr. President, in prohibiting the transmission of any matter
through the mails there ought to be great care used and it ought
to be particularly described and defined. . . . [Tlhere is a part
• . . that I think is vague and susceptible of abuse. It prohibits
the transmission through the mail of "every article or thing
intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use." What is an
"immoral use?" . . . The word "obscene" is well defined; we
can understand what that means; but when you prohibit every-
thing that is for an immoral use, there would be wide differences of
opinion on that point. ... There are many things that a portion
of our people would consider immoral that other portions would
consider entirely moral. 53
There was some discussion on this point, but it was decided that
what was immoral in one part of the country, was equally immoral
in another part of the country.54 The amendment provoked no dis-
cussion in the Senate and the bill was passed as amended.55
2. "Letter"
Congress next became actively concerned with obscenity in the
mails in 1888, by again amending section 3893 of the Revised Stat-
utes." The most important change was the inclusion of the phrase,
52 Id. at 4262.
53 Id. at 4263.
54 Unfortunately this has not proven to be the situation. One of the most recent
amendments to the obscenity statute (Act of August 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 962) was de-
signed to allow prosecution of offenders in at least two different jurisdictions; that
where the letter or obscene material was sent from, and that where the material was
received. The reason for the amendment being that it was sometimes difficult to obtain
convictions in certain jurisdictions. 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4012, 4014.
55 4 CONG. REc. 4403 (1876).
50 Act of September 26, 1888, ch. 1039, § 2, 25 Stat. 496, reads in part:
Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character . . . and every
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"letter... whether sealed as first-class matter or not." Earlier in the
year, a bill had been passed by Congress dealing with "obscene,
libelous, scurrilous, or threatening . . . language or [language] re-
flecting injuriously upon the character or conduct of another . . ."
appearing on the outside of envelopes. The main impetus behind
that bill had been a desire to suppress the practice of putting such
comments as "Bad Debtors' Association for the collection of bad
debts" on the outside of envelopes containing over-due bills. Sub-
sequent to its passage, however, a new problem arose, whereby the
same remarks were printed on letters enclosed in envelopes with
windows. This allowed the objectionable statements to be seen with-
out actually placing them on the outer envelope. 8 Numerous bills
were introduced at various times during the session to remedy the
situation, and finally, one was passed on September 26, 1888, which
not only amended the section dealing with material on the exterior of
envelopes, but also added the word eletter" to the list of prohibited
obscene items covered by Revised Statutes section 3893. 0 The dis-
cussion surrounding the passage of the bill gives no dear impression
whether or not noncommercial, handwritten, correspondence was in-
tended to be included within the general prohibition.60 Although,
indiscriminate dissemination of obscene publications was clearly
sought to be curbed by the act, it does not appear that private corre-
spondence between consenting adults was intended to in any way be
proscribed.
In addition to the "window loophole," the earlier 1888 obscenity
written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or
notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where or how,
or of whom, or by what means any of the hereinbefore mentioned matters,
articles or things may be obtained or made, whether sealed as first-class matter
or not, are hereby declared nonmailable matter ... . Provided, That nothing
in this act shall authorize any person to open any letter or sealed matter of
the first-class not addressed to himself. (Emphasis added.)
57 Act of June 18, 1888, ch. 394, § 2, 25 Stat. 188.
58 19 CONG. REc. 6733-34 (1888).
59 Statute cited note 56 supra.
60 19 CONG. REc. 7660-62 (1888). Senator Vest, in arguing against Senator Haw-
ley's suggestion to reduce the maximum sentence provided by the bill, said:
[Tjhese villainous publications have been sent to ladies, to young girls. In
one case a female academy was deluged with them. . . .A man who had a
grudge against a lady would send one of these things through the office [post
office] directed to the lady, and she would be outraged by tearing off the
envelope and finding the publication in her hands. . . .The present law did
not reach the case of written publications; it only applied to print. These
scoundrels went to work and used the new stylographic process, frequently
used by public men now, giving a fac-simile imitation of your letter and your
signature. They took these awful publications.., and stylographed them...
and they are being sent forth all over the country to young people.
CONG. Rc., supra at 7661.
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act had been defective in yet another respect. According to Repre-
sentative Dockery:
[I]n the former bill which passed the House and Senate, in the
opinion of the Postmaster General, implied authority was given
postmasters to inspect mail matter of the first-class, and of course,
it was not the intention of Congress to grant any such authority.6'
Consequently, the September bill included the amendment that,
"nothing in this act shall authorize any person to open any letter or
sealed matter of first-class not addressed to himself."' 2 This addition,
remarked Dockery,
[W]isely prohibits postmasters from opening letters to ascertain
their contents, but if, for instance, an obscene letter is addressed
to the gentleman from Missouri, he will have the authority under
this bill.. . to punish the sender. The postmaster, however, has no
authority to open the letter.63
It may be inferred from the above discussion that perhaps Congress
did in fact intend to proscribe private first-class letters, if they were
of the type generally referred to as "crank mail" or "hate mail." It
is highly doubtful, however, that Congress intended to allow the
postal inspectors to effectively circumvent the prohibition against
unauthorized opening of first-class mail by the use of decoy letters.64
61 19 CONG. REc. 8189 (1888).
62 Statute cited note 56 supra.
03 19 CONG. REC. 8189 (1888).
64 The phrase "decoy letters" refers to the practice of postal inspectors whereby they
place in local papers advertisements which seek "modem young couples" for purposes
of correspondence. People answer these advertisements believing they are writing to
another couple with similar interests, when in fact they are writing to a postal inspector.
When the letters become obscene enough to support a conviction, the postal inspector
confronts the party with the letters he has written.
The extent to which the postal authorities will go in the pursuit of obscenity is
illustrated by Phelper v. Texas, 396 S.W.2d 396, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965), in
which the defendant was convicted under a state statute for the possession of obscene
pictures. Here, the defendant exhibited some pictures "of nude women" to his milk-
man, who in turn, notified the police. A detective became friendly with the defendant
and upon finding him willing to sell some of the pictures, he notified a postal inspector.
The inspector, operating under the alias, Garrett, began corresponding with the de-
fendant relative to the pictures. When the detective returned to the defendant's home
to view some more pictures, the defendant informed him that he intended to send the
photographs to Garrett. Here, it is obvious that the defendant was encouraged by an
official of the Post Office Department to commit an act upon which an indictment could
be obtained. Apparently the pictures sent through the mail were not ones which would
sustain an indictment, nevertheless, the defendant was arrested and the police searched
his home where they found pictures of men and women engaged in sexual intercourse.
The defendant testified that he took the pictures upon the encouragement and induce-
ment of Detective Smith and a letter he had received from Garrett. Here, we have
people employed by the post office attempting to induce an individual to send material
through the mails which can be used to obtain a conviction under the obscenity statute.
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That is to say, the type of behavior with which Congress was con-
cerned was that which constituted an annoyance, or nuisance to the
recipient of a letter. There was no grant of authority to use decoy
letters in order to search out those people, who, if given the oppor-
tunity, might send obscene letters through the mails.
3. e(Filthy"
Congress did not act against obscene mail again until 1909,65 when
the phrase "and every filthy" was added to broaden the statute.00 This
time, however, lengthy debate as to the wisdom of such an amend-
ment preceded its passage. In the House, Houston of Tennessee
moved to add the words "vile, filthy or indecent." In opposition,
Payne of New York suggested that these words would add nothing
to the existing law. 7 Moon of Pennsylvania, the House sponsor of
the bill, agreed with Payne and argued further that to include the
word "indecent" in the statute would be undesirable:
This word has such a broad signification and means such different
things to different people-that is, so many persons consider some
things indecent that others do not-. . . . [A] t the time we were
considering this section in committee, [we] concluded that the
introduction of the word here would open such a broad field for
construction on the part of judges and the post office authorities
in the application of a criminal statute that it was unwise .... 08
Shereley of Kentuckey was of the same opinion:
[S] ome of us who have taken the trouble to look into the history
of this section and the matters that have been litigated in the
courts know that there is a very great danger by the use of such
words as are suggested . . . of giving to the Post Office Depart-
ment a censorship of the press.69
Gaines of West Virginia also voiced strong opposition:
I think there is a pretty general feeling in this House that the
power of the Post Office Department to control literature and to
control the business of the citizens of the country ought to be
curtailed rather than enlarged.70
Ultimately, a compromise was reached and the bill left the House
with only the word "filthy" added. When the bill reached the
65 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 211, 35 Stat. 1129.
66 42 CONG. REc. 979 (1909).
67 Id. at 995.
68 Id. at 996.
69 Ibid.
70 Id. at 997.
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Senate, a motion was again made to include the phrase "or vile, or
filthy, or disgusting," but it, too, met adverse reaction. Among those
voicing their disapproval was Senator Baily of Texas, who stated:
I think we have gone far enough with the postal authorities in
yielding to them at their solicitations and increasing their power.
I resent the idea that we have reached a point where we
have to make it a crime in this country for one man to disgust
another. ... 71
Notwithstanding the opposition, Congress in 1909 broadened the
statute by adding "and every filthy" to the category of prohibitions;
the words "indecent," "vile," or "disgusting," were not included.72
It would not be until 1965 and 1966 that Congress would again
demonstrate such concern over the growing power of the postal in-
spectors. In 1909 the concern centered primarily on broadening the
description of prohibited writing, while during the 1965 and 1966
Senate hearings73 the main concern would be with alleged invasions
of privacy which occurred when first-class mail was opened prior to
delivery.
F. Title 18 United States Code Section 1461
In 1948 the postal crimes, along with other federal crimes, were
assembled and codified in title 18 of the United States Code.74 The
laws regarding mailing obscene publications, and the mailing of en-
velopes with obscene or threatening matter on them, which laws
formerly had been spread throughout the Statutes at Large, were
now grouped into four sections. Section 3893 of the Revised Statutes
became 18 United States Code 1461.
The 1948 codification added little to the statute, but seven years
later, Congress amended section 1461 by adding the words "inde-
cent" and "vile" and by deleting the word "letter." 75 A lack of re-
71 Id. at 2391-92.
72 Congress in 1911 amended the statute by passing a rider to the postal appropria-
tions act for that fiscal year. This amendment defined indecent character to include,
"matter of a character intending to incite arson, murder, or assassination." Act of March
4, 1911, ch. 241, § 2, 36 Stat. 1339.
73 Hearings on Invasion of Privacy (Government Agencies) Before the Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 66.
74 18 U.S.C. § 1461 as enacted by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461, 62 Stat.
768. But see text accompanying note 143 infra, as to the unexpected effect which the
subtle change in wording of the statute (from "and every filthy..." to "filthy") had
on the subsequent case law.
75 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948) as amended by Act of June 28, 1955, ch. 190, 69 Stat.
183.
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ported debate on this 1955 amendment in either the House or Senate
imparts an inference that Congress acted on the strength of committee
reports, and in effect, endorsed in toto the recommendations made
therein. These reports pronounced desire to use general language in
the statute in order to "strike at all obscene matter." It is significant
to our discussion that the Senate report emphasized the belief that
the amendment would aid the struggle against juvenile delinquency.
In the committee's words:
The passage of S. 600 [the amending bill] will contribute greatly
in the continuing struggle to combat juvenile delinquency and the
corruption of public morals.76
The mood of Congress had changed noticeably since 1909. Now,
there was little, if any, opposition to extending the postal law's ap-
plication. "Vile" and "indecent," two words which had distressed
Representatives Gaines, Payne, Shereley, Houston, and Moon forty-
six years earlier were now appended by Congress without comment.
Since 1955 there have been on other amendments to section 1461
that are germane to our present discussion. Consequently, the end
result of our investigation into the statutory and common law history
of obscenity, bears witness to a definite lack of clear congressional
intent to circumscribe correspondence between consenting adults. It
is, in fact, questionable whether Congress ever intended to regulate
writing in first-class mail, no matter how pornographic, if that writ-
ing would not result in some manifestation of antisocial conduct.
While recognizing that part of the early basis for obscenity legisla-
tion, in this country as well as in England, was a desire to protect
public morals, it is difficult to believe that this aim has not given
way to an overriding congressional intent to curtail pornography
due to its suspected causal relationship to crime and juvenile delin-
quency. Thus, the purpose of obscenity legislation has become a func-
tional one of protecting the paternal interest which society has in its
youth. However, Congress can only enact such legislation; it remains
the task of the courts to effectuate this congressional mandate. As will
be pointed out in the following section, the judiciary has also shown,
amid much confusion, a similar aim in its interpretation of congres-
sional legislation.




A. Are Private Letters within the Obscenity Statutes?
The early history surrounding obscenity in private correspondence
was characterized by conflicting decisions and sporadic legislative
development. Under section 3893 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, the federal government began to prosecute the sending
of obscene matter through first-class mail. As originally enacted, the
statute prohibited the mailing of any "obscene, lewd, or lascivious
book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print, or other publication of an
indecent character." In 1876 the statute was amended to include the
word "writing" within the enumerated items, the mailing of which
was prohibited.7 7 Following this amendment, however, several federal
courts refused to hold that private letters were to be included in the
classification "writing." In 1880, United States v. Williams78 held
that the aim of the statute was to prohibit "published" material
which had "the added characteristic of proposed circulation and
distribution." Two years later, United States v. Lofti 9 gave added
weight to Williams by requiring a "publication" before the obscene
matter could be brought within the purview of section 3893.80 These
courts held further, that the word "writing" as set out in the statute,
usually means some type of legal document, such as a will or a deed.
At the same time, an opposite view was espoused by other federal
courts which held that private letters were within the purview of the
obscenity statute. In United States v. Gaylord,", the defendant con-
tended that a private letter was not within the terms of the statute
because it was not a publication. In rejecting the argument, the court
held that the word "publication" did not modify the preceding words
in the statute, and agreed further, that books and pamphlets are often
not published but merely written. The Gaylord court apparently
77 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90.
78 3 Fed. 484, 489 (Commissioner's Court, E.D.N.Y. 1880).
70 12 Fed. 671 (D. Ore. 1882). In addition, the court emphasized the private nature
of first-class mail: "It was never the intention of the law to take cognizance of what
passes between individuals in private communication under the sanctity and security of
a seal." United States v. Loftis, supra at 673.
80 These two cases were followed in United States v. Huggett, 40 Fed. 636 (C.C.-
N.D. Ohio 1889); United States v. Mathias, 36 Fed. 892 (C.C.D.S.C. 1888); United
States v. Comerford, 25 Fed. 902 (W.D. Tex. 1885).
81 17 Fed. 438, (C.C.S.D. Il1. 1883).
82 Id. at 440-41; accord, United States v. Morris, 18 Fed. 900 (C.C.D. Ore. 1884);
United States v. Thomas, 27 Fed. 682 (S.D. Miss. 1886) ; United States v. Baitton, 17
Fed. 731 (Commissioner's Court, S.D. Ohio 1883).
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found that the mere fact that an article is hand-written does not ex-
clude it from being a "publication."
These conflicting decisions among the lower federal courts were
resolved in the Supreme Court case of United States v. Chase.8 3 In
Chase, the Court followed the reasoning of those federal courts which
had equated the statutory word "writing" with some type of legal
document, and thus held that a "writing" must come within one of
the other particular classes such as "book, pamphlet, picture, and
paper." Therefore to include private letters within the statutory pro-
vision, Congress would have to mention them specifically.
The obscenity statute was amended in 18884 to include the word
"letter" among the list of items prohibited. Despite this congressional
action, certain lower federal courts refused to accede to the legislative
intent, and took the position that even though the word "letter" was
now contained in the statute, "letter" did not include private corre-
spondence because such letters did not possess the characteristics of
a "publication" within the meaning of the statute.8s However, the
views of these courts were in conflict with the holdings of other
federal courts. In the decision of In re Wahll,80 the judge held that
private letters were encompassed by the amendment:
In my opinion since the amendment of September 26, 1888, there
can be no reasonable doubt that Congress dearly expressed its
intention to include obscene letters, whether private and sealed or
unsealed.87
In United States v. Andrews"' the Supreme Court resolved the
issue. There, the Court held that the word "letter" included all
private letters, sealed or unsealed, containing obscene matter, point-
ing out, perhaps erroneously, that this was the obvious intent of
Congress.
From the time of the Andrews decision, until 1955, the problem of
whether "letter" included private correspondence lay dormant. In
83 135 U.S. 255 (1890). Although the Chase case came before the Supreme Court
in 1890, it was prosecuted under the older version of the statute under which the indict-
ment had been drawn.
84 Act of Sept. 26, 1888, ch. 1039, § 2, 25 Stat. 496. Statute cited note 56 supra.
85 See United States v. Jarvis, 59 Fed. 357 (N.D. Wash. 1894); United States v.
Warner, 59 Fed. 355 (N.D. Wash. 1894); United States v. Wilson, 58 Fed. 768 (N.D.
Cal. 1893); United States v. Clark, 43 Fed. 574 (S.D. Iowa 1890).
86 42 Fed. 822 (D. Minn. 1890).
87 Id. at 826; accord, United States v. Ling, 61 Fed. 1001 (D. Conn. 1894); United
States v. Nathan, 61 Fed. 936 (N.D. Iowa 1894); United States v. Martin, 50 Fed.
918 (W.D. Va. 1892).
88 162 U.S. 420, 424 (1896).
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that year Congress passed an amendment to section 1461,89 the then-
existent obscenity statute, deleting the word "letter" and adding the
term "article." In affirming the conviction of the petitioner who had
sent an obscene letter through the mails, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Thomas v. United States,90 rejected the argument that by
deleting the word "letter" from the statute Congress evidenced an
intent that private correspondence not be included within the statute.
The Thomas court stated that the 1955 amendment was a measure to
provide for a more comprehensive coverage, and Congress most
certainly did not intend to exclude private letters from that coverage.
The Supreme Court has yet to definitively rule upon the question of
whether private letters come within the present obscenity statute, and
in Redmond v. United States0 ' the Court avoided resolving the issue
by a per curiam reversal of an obscenity conviction.
At this point in our discussion it would be helpful to divide private
letters which have led to prosecutions under the obscenity statute into
three general categories. The first category is comprised of letters
which come within the terms "obscene, lewd, lascivious, and in-
decent." These terms will be discussed under the sub-heading "Ob-
scene Letters." The second type of letter leading to prosecution is
that which contains no direct language that could be termed obscene,
but which supposedly solicits "immoral" conduct. The third category
consists of letters which are of an insulting and derogatory nature,
intended merely to offend the person to whom they are sent. All the
above types of letters have been prosecuted by the Justice Depart-
ment as violations of the obscenity statute. For the purpose of this
note, each group will be treated separately until the discussion of
Roth v. United States.
2
B. Letters Resulting in Obscenity Prosecutions
1. "Obscene Letters"93
The American judicial definition of obscenity is derived from
English case law. In United States v. Bennett,94 the Circuit Court for
the Southern District of New York, deciding what constituted ob-
89 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948), as amended by Act of June 28, 1955, ch. 190, 69 Stat.
183.
90 262 F.2d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1959).
91 384 U.S. 264 (1966). See note 165 infra.
92 35 4U.S. 476 (7957). This case will be discussed later. See text accompanying
note 147 infra.
93 Discussion of obscene matter includes "lewd, lascivious, and indecent."
94 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1104 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
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scenity under section 3893 of the Revised Statutes,95 followed the
rule set out in The Queen v. Hieklin:98
The test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a pub-
lication of this sort may fall. Now, with regard to this work, it is
quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the very young
of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts
of a most impure and libidinous character.97
The Hicklin rule was later adopted by the Supreme Court in Rosen
v. United States,98 and Swearingen v. United States.99 In Swearingen
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Hicklin test for obscenity, but held
that the allegedly obscene newspaper article'00 was mailable because
it did not come within the limits of the Hicklin rule. Holding that the
words of the statute, "obscene, lewd, or lascivious," do not describe
three separate offenses but only one, the Court found the apparently
libelous article in this case was not obscene because it did not fall
under the offense at which the statute was aimed, namely, to prohibit
the use of the mails to circulate or deliver matter to corrupt the
morals of the people. . . . The words "obscene, lewd, and lasci-
vious," as used in the statute, signify that form of immorality which
has relation to sexual impurity, and have the same meaning as is
given them at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.101
In the years that followed, several courts voiced their opinions pur-
porting to add to, or clarify the meaning of the Swearingen rule.102
95 As amended by Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90.
96 [1886] 3 Q.B. 360.
97 United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. at 1104.
98 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
99 161 U.S. 446 (1896).
100 The article read: "[T]his black hearted coward is known to every decent man,
woman, and child in the community as a liar, perjurer, and slanderer, who would sell
a mother's honor with less hesitancy and for much less silver than Judas betrayed the
Savior, and who would pimp and fatten on a sister's shame with as much unction as a
buzzard gluts in carrion. He is a contemptible scoundrel and political blackleg of the
lowest cut. He is pretending to serve Democracy and is at the same time in the pay of
the Republican party. He has been known as the companion of negro strumpets and
has revelled in the lowest debauches .... He is lower, meaner, filthier, rottener than
the rottenest strumpet that prowls the streets by night." Id. at 447 n.1.
101 Swearingen v. United States, supra note 99, at 450-51. (Emphasis added.)
102 See Dysart v. United States, 272 U.S. 655 (1926); Griffin v. United States, 248
Fed. 6 (1st Cir. 1918); Magon v. United States, 248 Fed. 201 (9th Cir. 1918); Bots-
ford v. United States, 215 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1914) ; Knowles v. United States, 170
Fed. 409 (8th Cir. 1909); MacFadden v. United States, 165 Fed. 51 (3d Cir. 1908);
Hanson v. United States, 157 Fed. 749 (7th Cir. 1907) ; Burton v. United States, 142
Fed. 57 (8th Cir. 1906); United States v. Davidson, 244 Fed. 523 (N.D.N.Y. 1917);
United States v. O'Donnell, 165 Fed. 218 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); United States v. Bene.
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United States v. Wrightmanl0 held that obscenity "implies some-
thing tending to suggest libidinous thoughts or excite impure de-
sires." United States v. Wroblenski'04 quotes the obscenity test of
Swearingen and then states, "In other words, the tendency must be
to corrupt the recipient, and not merely to offend or hurt, as the
charge relates to a sealed letter.... ." In United States v. O'Donnel' 0 5
and United States v. Benedict, °6 a New York district court reiterated
the rule that the sealed letter must contain language which will have
or which may have "an immoral effect, in the sense relating to sexual
impurity, upon whose hands the writing may come."lo 7 This rule was
followed in United States v. Davidson,:"8 where the writer of a letter
accused the addressee of being a prostitute and the mother of a
bastard child, and of being surrounded by prostitutes and bastards,
and threatened to inform people generally of the addressee's repu-
tation. The court felt that this letter was not within the statute be-
cause it could not corrupt the morals of the person to whom it was
sent. These cases all reveal that the judiciary's principal concern
seemed to be with the possible corrupting influence which the article
may have upon the recipient.
In Knowles v. United States,10 9 the court broadened the Swear-
ingen test by stating the "true test to determine whether a writing"
is nonmailable under the section as it now reads "is whether its lan-
guage has a tendency to deprave and corrupt the morals of those
whose minds are open to such influences, and into whose hands it
may fall, by arousing or implanting in such minds obscene, lewd,
or lascivious thoughts or desires." ' 10 By the phrase "and into whose
hands it may fall," the court focuses its attention upon the indis-
criminate dissemination of obscene matter, a concern which has since
permeated the court decisions. However, this emphasis upon the
indiscriminate dissemination is in basic conflict with the nature of
a private letter sent to one particular person.
The Hicklin rule, although modified, and made subject to varia-
tions such as the Swearingen test, has had a lasting effect on obscenity
dict, 165 Fed. 221 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); United States v. Vega, 3 P.R. Fed. 480
(1908); United States v. Wyatt, 122 Fed. 316 (D. Del. 1903).
103 29 Fed. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1886).
104 118 Fed. 495-96 (E.D. Wis. 1902).
105 165 Fed. 218 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
106 165 Fed. 221 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
10T Id. at 222.
108 244 Fed. 523, 529 (N.D.N.Y. 1917).
109 170 Fed. 409 (8th Cir. 1909).
110 Id. at 412. (Emphasis added.)
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law. However, one of the primary factors under consideration in the
above cases is the aspect of the effect of the letter, or other writing,
on its recipient-i--a test very different from the "average man" stan-
dard which has been applied by modern courts.
The first case to apply the "average man" test to determine whether
the matter mailed tended to corrupt the morals of the recipient was
United States v. Levine."' There, the defendant was tried for mail-
ing obscene circulars which advertised obscene books. The trial court
judge had charged the jury that the statute was directed against
stimulating sensuality and that the degree of stimulation was not to
be measured by its effect, either on the highly prudish, or the highly
educated, but rather upon the average human mind. Although the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this charge to the jury, it
reversed on other statements made by the trial judge, and went on
to criticize the Hicklin rule, saying simply that the Supreme Court
never adopted it.112 .While the Levine court conceded that the Hicklin
rule had been followed by many of the lower federal courts, it
reasoned that these courts had merely cited the rule as authority
without considering its merits. Although the Levine court cites Bur-
ton v. United States,"8 United States v. Clarke,"4 and United States
v. Smith"1 5 as possible support for an obscenity standard based on the
reactions of those to whom the article was sent, it states that it was
now overruling those decisions as they applied to this, the Second
Circuit. The court justified its position by voicing a warning against
what it considered to be the unjust effects of the Hieklin rule:
This earlier doctrine necessarily presupposed that the evil against
which the statute is directed so much outweighs all interest of art,
letters or science, that they must yield to the mere possibility that
some prurient person may get a sensual gratification from reading
or seeing what to most people is innocent and may be delightful or
enlightening. No civilized community not fanatically puritanical
would tolerate such an imposition, and we do not believe that the
courts that have declared it, would have applied it consistently.11
Despite the Levine court's avowed purpose of narrowing the test
of obscenity, it failed. No court had yet proposed that the Hicklin
M' 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
112 Id. at 157. But see Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896), and Swear-
ingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 451 (1896), where the court seemed to adopt the
Hicklin rule.
113 142 Fed. 57 (8th Cir. 1906).
114 38 Fed. 732 (E.D. Mo. 1889).
115 45 Fed. 476 (E.D. Wis. 1891).
110 United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
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rule deemed matter obscene if there was "the mere possibility" that
some unbalanced person might in some way come upon it. What
Levine actually did was to place upon the jury the onerous task of
deciding what the "average man" would consider obscene.
The "average man" test was further refined in Burnstein v. United
States,1 7 where the court held the test to be applied was whether
the matter was offensive to the common sense of decency and modesty
of the community, and also, whether the matter tended to suggest
or arouse sexual desires or thoughts in the minds of those who might
be depraved or corrupted by such matter. Here, the Burnstein court
seems to have come to a curious mixture of both the objective and
subjective tests.
In Verner v. United States,"' a 1950 case, the court rejected any
application of a subjective test of obscenity to private correspondence.
There, the defendant had written two letters attacking the chastity of
his former paramour, and containing a lewd suggestion about her
relationship with another man who was also a recipient of one of the
letters. In upholding the conviction, the circuit court refused to
consider evidence that the addressees of the letters, both adults, could
not have been induced by the letters to commit any act of sexual
immorality. Similarly rejecting the subjective test, Cain v. United
States,"0 affirmed a conviction under section 1461 of a defendant
who had sent his girl friend letters described by the court as dealing
"in a shockingly gross and sensual manner with sex matters," and
stated that the mailing of the letters violated the statute irrespective
of their exciting lustful thoughts in the addressee's mind.
The "average man" test was utilized in ruling upon the obscenity
of five private letters in Ackerman v. United States.120 There, a
magazine writer and researcher in the field of lesbianism and homo-
sexuality, mailed five letters, with pictures enclosed to a 38-year-old
father, under the assumption that the addressee was a lesbian. An
interesting fact of the case was that apparently the addressee, in
answering the defendant's letters, wrote nothing to dispel this as-
sumption.' 21 Describing the letters as "filled with wildly erotic, filthy,
prurient comments and inquiries concerning the details of the ad-
117 8 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1949).
118 183 F.2d 184, 185 (9th Cir. 1950).
.10 274 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960).
120 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961).
121 Brief for Appellant, p. 6, United States v. Ackerman, 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1961).
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dressee's private parts," the court refused to apply what the accused
contended should be the proper test in cases of noncommercial pri-
vate correspondence: whether the material was an appeal to the
prurient interest of the only person likely to receive it, specifically,
the addressee. The court in rejecting the proposed subjective test
reasoned first, that the statute includes private correspondence, and
second, that to adopt the accused's proposed interpretation of section
1461 would make the statute inapplicable in one of the types of
cases which it was intended to cover, namely, "the indiscriminate
mailing of filthy and obscene, although purportedly private letters by
crackpots or perverts."'' 22 The court also felt that such an interpreta-
tion might also endanger well-intentioned letter writers with prose-
cution because of the reaction of the addressee. The court does not
seem to have realized the apparent contradiction in its reason for
rejecting the defendant's argument, that is, that "well-intentioned
letter writers do not send letters indiscriminately." The court claimed
that one of the purposes of the statute was to prevent the indiscrim-
inate mailing of obscene private letters. This may be so, but in the
Ackerman case, the letters had been sent to only one person. To
apply this court's reasoning as a general rule would create an in-
justice, for most cases do not involve an indiscriminate sending of ob-
scene letters. The Ackerman court overlooked a possible solution
which would allow a defense, based on evidence that the addressee
could not be led to commit any act of sexual immorality from the
letter involved, to rebut the general presumption based on the "aver-
age man" test.
Even after Levine's espousal of the "average man" test there have
been cases accepting the reaction of the particular recipient to be a
determinate factor. The very nature of these cases shows the im-
practicality of a general application of the "average man" test. Hence,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 2 held that a "conditional
privilege" was accorded to mailers of works of scientific or literary
merit, and that such works were not obscene if the persons for whom
they were intended were "among the privileged classes" of persons
who would not abuse the information contained in such articles. The
same privilege was also accorded by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals124 to a report by a consumer's organization to prop-
122 Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d at 453. (Emphasis added.)
123 United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
629 (1940) ; United States v. Nicholas, 97 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1938).
124 Consumers Union of United States v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1910),
where the court allowed the mailing of contraceptive information to married couples
who certified that they used prophylactics on the advice of a physician.
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erly qualified persons. These cases demonstrate the desirability of
maintaining a policy which allows for certain exceptions to the
"average man" test when adherence to it would appear to inhibit
the educational or informational processes. But even with such a
policy, the courts are merely allowed to make value judgments as
to who is qualified to view obscenity and who is not. The problem
of apprising the citizen who uses the mails to transmit obscene mat-
ter as to whether he is a possible offender still remains unsolved.
In general, the "average man" test, when applied to private let-
ters, allows a jury to decide in any specific case whether an entirely
private matter is obscene to the average man. This, in effect, allows
a decision based on the jury's own impressions and prejudices, and
can easily lead to an unjust and hypocritical result. In other words,
a person, before writing a letter which to him is not obscene, must
stop and decide whether twelve men or women would feel that his
letter would be obscene to the "average man." There are two reason-
able alternatives to this dilemma. One alternative would be to adopt
a new defense for private correspondence cases. 12 '5 The second alter-
native would be to completely withdraw private letters from the
purview of the obscenity statute.
2. "Letters Containing Language Not Directly Obscene or Filthy
but Soliciting Immoral Conduct"
The federal government has prosecuted cases involving letters
which in themselves contain no words capable of being termed "ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy." These letters generally contain
some type of suggestion which the postal authorities designate as an
attempt to solicit "immoral" conduct. A notorious case in point is
United States v. Martin.12 Here, the accused sent a letter to a woman,
with whom he had had only a visual acquaintance, asking her to
take an overnight journey with him to a nearby town. He promised
to pay her expenses plus an additional five dollars, with the added
thought that, if she would accompany him, he would give her a
nice time and she would never regret it. The court held that this
letter violated the obscenity statute, and defined obscenity in emo-
tional rather than academic terms, as "that which is offensive to
chastity and modesty," adding that this letter would offend the
chastity of any "pure-minded woman."' 27
125 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 251.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
126 50 Fed. 918 (W.D. Va. 1892).
127 Id. at 921. Thus proving that Judge Magruder's well-known statement "that
there is no harm in asking" may not be true if one asks through the mails. Magruder,
1967]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
In contrast to Martin, United States v. Lamkin128 sustained a mo-
tion to quash an indictment under the obscenity statute, holding that,
although the accused was undoubtedly attempting to use the mails for
a "heinous offense against society" and affecting "assignation and se-
duction," there was nothing indecent in the language, words or ex-
pressions used, and therefore there was no indictable offense. 20 A
decade later, the same court in United States v. Journal Co.,180 re-
fused to sustain an indictment against a defendant who had used the
mail to transmit copies of testimony in a celebrated criminal case.
In Parish v. United States,131 the accused had sent a letter in which
he claimed that he, and others had seen the addressee, a young female
school teacher, in a compromising position with a named man, at a
particular time and place. He requested that the addressee meet and
talk with him, either at his place of business or at a place selected by
her. The court held that while there was no obscene language used,
the immoral intent of the writer was clear. The defendant had
charged a woman of presumably good character with immoral con-
duct in order to obtain a private meeting with her; enough, declared
the court, to sustain a conviction under the statute.
However, in Krause v. United States,'82 the court rejected an argu-
ment based on the writer's supposedly immoral intent. The govern-
ment contended that the defendant's letter was an invitation to en-
gage in homosexual activity. In voicing its disapproval of the action,
the court critically analyzed the situation:
The letter was written by one man to another and does not on its
face contain a single obscene, lewd, or lascivious word, or a sug-
gestion of an immoral or indecent character, and in the absence of
such obscene word or indecent suggestion in the letter no such
construction can be given thereto. The statute alone creates and
defines the crime, and the government cannot, by suggestion,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Htv. L. REv. 1033, 1055
(1936).
128 73 Fed. 459 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1896).
120 Id. at 463, where the court said: "The statute does not declare that the letter
must be written for an indecent or obscene purpose, but that the letter itself, in its
language, shall be of indecent character. The letters set out in the indictment are not
themselves of indecent character, and, if used for such purposes as have been named,
congress has not made such purposes criminal. When a law denounces a letter con-
taining obscene language, and does not denounce a letter decent in terms, but written
for an indecent purpose, an indictment founded only upon the obscene purpose cannot
be maintained."
130 197 Fed. 415 (E.D. Va. 1912).
131 247 Fed. 40 (4th Cir. 1917).
132 29 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1928).
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innuendo, averment, or charge, add to its provisions, nor can it
widen the statute's application by adding to the letter or writing
something not contained therein.133
Although the foregoing actions would concededly succumb to the
comparatively recent Roth standard of obscenity,1' there are further
arguments to demonstrate why these actions should be outside the
scope of government regulation. To illustrate, it becomes apparent
that prosecution for this type of offensive letter could only come about
in one of three ways:
(1) pursuant to a complaint registered by an individual addressee;
(2) through the illegal interception and investigation by postal
authorities of first class mail;
(3) through the devious practice of enticing suspected offenders
to send objectionable letters to agents employed by the postal
authorities.
This last method borders on entrapment and would appear to be a
completely unjustifiable function for the Department. Under each
type of prosecution, juries would be confronted with additional prob-
lems in ascertaining the motives of the alleged offender, and in de-
termining what shall constitute sexually immoral conduct between
adults. The reader should note with particularity the additional bur-
den which these problems impose upon the juror who has already
been charged with the difficult task of applying the "average man"
test."' It is questionable, in light of the problems posed, whether
continued prosecutions for mailing letters which merely solicit im-
moral conduct will lead to results that are just or desirable.
133 Id. at 251. (Emphasis added.) The letter reads:
My Dear Buddy
No doubt you will be surprised to hear from me, but I just had to inquire
how you are. I have been thinking of you every day since we met, as I enjoyed
our meeting, and I hope you could meet me quite often, if convenience pre-
sents itself. Now, Buddy, I will be down the chateau this Friday night at 8.
So if you can come which I hope you can, I will meet you at the station, at
Severna Park, in the meantime I will try to call for you at the Hospital with
a Friend and his car. So try to get your little Pal to come with you no others.
I will call you up Friday noon time if every think [sic] will be o.k. trusting
you are well and happy as Sat morning last, you know. So try to come.
Yours truly Victor Krause.
With sincere regards.
Krause v. United States, supra at 249. See Dysart v. United States, 272 U.S. 655
(1926).
134 See text accompanying note 160 infra.
135 See text accompanying note 125 supra.
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3. "Filthy Letters"
Historically, before a court would declare a letter obscene, it had
to at least meet the requirements of the Hicklin rule, that is, it had
to have the tendency to deprave and corrupt the morals of those who
might receive it. Letters which were extremely crude and insulting
could not lead to conviction because they could not possibly corrupt
the morals of anyone. In United States v. Wyatt,230 the court stated
that "the contents of a letter may be coarse, vulgar, and indecent,
and yet the letter not be obscene, lewd, or lascivious within the
meaning of the statute.' 3 7 And, in Swearingen, the Supreme Court
held that letters which are merely abusive, profane, coarse, scur-
rilous, and vulgar, or even libelous are not within the prohibition
of the statute. United States v. Wirightman,'3 8 held that, although
the letters were exceedingly coarse and vulgar, one of them being
grossly libelous, they were not within the statute. The preceding
three cases paved the road for the amendment to the Revised Statutes
(the obscenity statute) which made nonmailable every "obscene,
lewd or lascivious, and every filthy, book... or other publication of
an indecent character."'31 9 Yet, even following this statutory modifi-
cation, some lower courts continued to hold that the crude insulting
type of letter was still not within the statute, and thereby treated the
new phrase as nothing more than a modifier of the words that ap-
pear before it in the statute. 140
However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Limehouse'41
reached a different result. In Limehouse, Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing
for the majority, held that the trial court had erred in quashing the
indictment of one charged with mailing "a certain filthy letter and
writing." Although the trial court had reasoned that the letter was
not obscene, the Supreme Court declared that the words "and every
filthy" in the statute "added a new class of unmailable matter-the
filthy."'1 42
The wording of the statute was further modified by the amend-
136 122 Fed. 316 (D. Del. 1903).
137 Id. at 317-18; accord, Dysart v. United States, 272 U.S. 655, 658 (1926). See
United States v. O'Donnell, 165 Fed. 218, 219 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); Hanson v.
United States, 157 Fed. 749 (7th Cir. 1907) ; United States. v. Wroblenski, 118 Fed.
495 (E.D. Wis. 1902).
138 29 Fed. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1886).
139 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 211, 35 Stat. 1129. (Emphasis added.)
140 United States v. Klauder, 240 Fed. 501, 504 (N.D.N.Y. 1917).
141 285 U.S. 424 (1932).
142 Id. at 426.
143 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461, 62 Stat. 768.
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ment of 1948.48 The wording was changed at that time to "every
obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article." Notwith-
standing the Supreme Court interpretation, and the subsequent legis-
lative action, certain of the lower federal courts persisted in recog-
nizing "filthy" as a separate class of nonmailable matter, not bound
by either the new or old versions of the statute.14
However, in the 1961 case, Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v.
United States,145 the Court reasoned that the words "indecent, filthy
or vile" as used in the statute, were limited in their meaning by the
preceding words "obscene, lewd, lascivious." The fact that this case
is better reasoned is dear when we consider the ironic statement made
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Limehouse:
The lower court failed to recognize that the amendment introduced,
not merely a word, but a phrase. Disregarding the collection of
words, it treated the amended clause as if it had read "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy," [as it now does read], and then, apply-
ing the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, gave to "filthy" the meaning
attributed in the Swearingen case to the words "obscene, lewd, or
lasdvious." 146
This statement by Justice Brandeis has now come back to haunt the
courts because the present form of the statute uses the precise lan-
guage of Justice Brandeis' hypothetical. Therefore, applying the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis to the wording of the present obscenity
statute, one has to conclude that "filthy" modifies the words before
it and does not designate a separate class of nonmailable material.
Considering this reasoning, it appears that today, an indictment based
on a letter being "filthy" would fail unless it could also be brought
within the classification of "obscene."
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF SECTION
1461 TO PRIVATE LETTERS
This portion of the note will be devoted to a determination, based
upon the Supreme Court decisions handed down in the last decade,
of whether or not private correspondence between consenting adults
144 Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.2d 307, 308 (1st Cir.
1961); Verner v. United States, 183 F.2d 184, 185 (9th Cir. 1950); Big Table, Inc.
v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254, 262 (N.D. 11. 1960).
145 273 F.2d 799, 803 (1st Cir. 1960).
146 United States v. Limehouse, 285 U.S. 424, 426 (1932); The doctrine of nosci-
tor a sociis means, "that general and specific words are associated with and take color
from each other . . . . The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accom-
panying words." BLAcK, LAw DIcToNARY (4th ed. 1951).
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may be circumscribed by the provisions of section 1461. In order to
clarify the confusing nature of these decisions, this discussion will
be divided into three separate questions: (1) What is the current
definitional test of obscenity? (2) Can private correspondence fall
within this definition as obscene? (3) Does prosecution of private
correspondence coincide with the basic policy underlying the ob-
scenity laws?
A. The Current Definitional Test of Obscenity
In 1957 the constitutionality of section 1461 was seriously chal-
lenged for the first time. Prior to Roth v. United States147 the validity
of the obscenity statute had been assumed; however, in Roth, the
Supreme Court explicitly announced its intention to determine the
constitutional question. The specific issue under consideration was
whether the publication and sale of obscenity, however defined, could
be criminally punished in light of first amendment guarantees. The
court, after stating that obscenity is not protected speech under the
First Amendment since it is "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance,"'148 proclaimed the standard for obscenity to be "whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interests.' ' 149 Thus, while affirming the conviction of the
defendant, the Court set forth what appeared to be a definitional test
for future obscenity cases.150
After the decision in Roth, the Court had an opportunity to apply
its new standard in several diverse situations. In 1957, the Court
reversed convictions dealing with magazines for nudists151 and those
147 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
148 Id. at 484.
149 Id. at 489.
150 The reader should be advised at this juncture that there was in fact no Roth
definition. Although in several decisions the Court does refer to the Roth definition
or the Roth test, it at the same time (often on the same page) observes that "our dis-
cussion of definition was not intended to develop all the nuances of a definition re-
quired by the constitutional guarantees." Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508
n.7 (1966). Further, the Court in Roth was only concerned "with the question
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect material that is admittedly
obscene, the Court there had no occasion to explore the application of a particular
obscenity standard." Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489 (1962). (Em-
phasis added.) It is apparent that the definition of obscenity is not rigid but fluid,
and to speak of the Roth definition without recognizing the subsequent refinements
would be quite incorrect.
151 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d
114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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which were meant to appeal to homosexuals." 2 Both decisions were
per curiam opinions in which the Court reversed merely by citing the
Roth case.
It was not until 1962 that the Court enunciated further guidelines
as an aid in determining what actually constitutes obscenity. In
Manual Enterprises v. Day,153 the Court was squarely presented with
the question of whether or not the materials before it were obscene-
a question the Court was not faced with in Roth. Speaking for a
splintered Court,154 Mr. Justice Harlan with Mr. Justice Stewart
joining, held that the court of appeals had misconstrued Roth by
making prurient interest the sole test of obscenity, and that such a
reading of the Roth case "would be not only inconsistent with section
1461 and its common-law background, but out of keeping with Roth's
evident purpose to tighten obscenity standards."' 55 The Court as-
serted that the statute was aimed at obnoxious material, and de-
clined "to attribute to Congress any such quixotic and deadening
purpose as would bar from the mails all material, not patently of-
fensive, which stimulates impure desires relating to sex. Indeed such
a construction of section 1461 would doubtless encounter constitu-
tional barriers."'156 In summary, to find obscenity under the federal
statute, Manual Enterprises required proof of two distinct elements:
patent offensiveness and prurient interest appeal. Both had to conjoin
before challenged material could be found obscene under section 1461.
Two years later in Jacobellis v. Ohio,57 the Supreme Court, again
hopelessly split, chose an Ohio obscenity prosecution as a vehicle to
further refine the obscenity standard. Under the impression that it
152 One Incorporated v. Oleson, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1957). See also Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, reversing 244
F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
153 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
154 Mr. Justice Harlan announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in
which Mr. Justice Stewart joined. Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result and wrote
no separate opinion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice White took no part in
the decision of the case. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Douglas joined, concurred in the reversal but on different grounds. Mr.
Justice Clark dissented.
155 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. at 487.
156 Ibid. (Citation omitted.)
157 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Mr. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the
Court, and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Goldberg joined. Mr. Justice
White concurred in the judgment, but wrote no separate opinion. Mr. Justice Black,
joined by Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in reversal but on different grounds. Mr.
Justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion. The Chief Justice, joined by Mr.
Justice Clark, dissented. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in a separate opinion.
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was reiterating the Roth standard, the Court announced that material
could not be constitutionally proscribed unless utterly without socially
redeeming value.'58 This element came to constitute a separate and
distinct constitutional test apart from the relevant questions of pruri-
ent interest and patent offensiveness. Perhaps the best summary of
these criteria is to be found in the recent case of Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts, 59 another obscenity case decided without a majority opinion.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Fortas, declared:
We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms: "[W]hether
to the average persons, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest." . . . Under this definition, as elaborated in
subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be estab-
lished that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.10
The Court further cautioned that each of the three federal criteria
must be applied independently. Memoirs, standing alone, connotes
that for material to be declared constitutionally obscene, each of the
three criteria must be proven as elements of the government's case.
Two cases decided the same day, Mishkin v. New York' 0' and Ginz-
158 Id. at 191.
159 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Mr. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the
Court, and delivered an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fortas
joined. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the reversal for other
reasons. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Clark, Mr.
Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice White dissented in three separate opinions.
160 Id. at 418. (Citation omitted; emphasis added.)
161 383 U.S. 502 (1966). In this case, the defendant had been prosecuted and
found guilty under a New York statute of illegally hiring others to produce, publish-
ing, and possessing obscene books which dealt fictionally with such deviant practices
as lesbianism, fetishism, and flagellation. The defendant contended that the prurient
appeal test had not been met since these books would disgust rather than appeal to
the prurient interest of the average person (element (a), see text accompanying note
160 supra). In rejecting this argument, the Court explained that "where the material
is designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group,
rather than the public at large, the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test is
satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex of the members of that group." Mishkin v. New York, supra
at 508. This appears to be a significant and fully supportable modification of the
Roth test. The Court cautioned that the recipient group had to be "defined with more
specificity than in terms of [the] sexually immature .... " Mishkin v. New York,
supra at 509.
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burg v. United States,16 2 have somewhat reshaped the first and third
elements set out in Memoirs; nevertheless, it seems clear that the
second element of "patent offensiveness" emerges unscathed. As will
appear in the immediately following discussion, the second element
by definition excludes private correspondence as a class to which the
statute can be constitutionally applied.
162 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The defendant and three corporations which he controlled
were convicted of violating § 1461. Formerly the Court in determining the obscenity
vel non had, as a rule, confined its investigation to the questionable material. Never-
theless, the Court here went on to "view the publications against a background of
commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal."
Ginzburg v. United States, supra at 466. (Footnote omitted.) This decision con-
siderably modifies elements (a) and (c) of the obscenity test (see text accompanying
note 160 supra) by stating that "where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the
sexually provocative aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the
determination of obscenity. Ginzburg v. United States, supra at 470. (Emphasis
added.) This statement and other statements throughout the opinion (and also in
Memoirs), indicate that a publication not obscene by the Roth test may become obscene
under certain circumstances. Specifically, the Court explained that if the material has
prurient appeal and is patently offensive, then evidence of the commercial exploitation
of the erotic parts of the work will override a finding of minimal social value. The
Court did not propose to eliminate the third element of the test, that the book must
be utterly without social redeeming importance, but rather meant that "where the
purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications, a
court could accept his evaluation at its face value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 420 (1966).
Evidence of the exploitation of the sexually stimulating parts of the publication
will also be considered in determining the dominant theme of the material. Hypo-
thetically, a book with little erotica, but marketed to the exclusion of any redeeming
merits the work might have, could be suppressed as obscene, whereas a book largely
erotic but marketed without reference to that erotica could be declared not obscene.
In the Court's words "the deliberate representation of petitioners' publications as
erotically arousing .. . stimulated the reader to accept them as prurient; he looks for
titillation, not for saving intellectual content." Ginzburg v. United States, supra at 470.
This could be interpreted as establishing that the defendant's conduct will determine
whether the material appeals to the prurient interest. However, it would seem better
to limit evidence of the defendant's conduct to a determination of what the dominant
theme of the material is, and not extend consideration of that evidence to the question
of whether that dominant theme appeals to prurient interests. This conclusion is valid
even in the face of such comments by the Court is, "they [defendants] proclaimed
its obscenity; and we cannot conclude that the court below erred in taking their
[defendants'] own evaluation at its face value and declaring the book as a whole
obscene despite the other evidence." Ginzburg v. United States, supra at 472. (Footnote
omitted.) Literally read, this statement leads to the undesirable conclusion that a
publication lacking in prurient appeal could be condemned as obscene if portrayed
by the disseminator as having prurient appeal. This indeed would be "an astonishing
piece of judicial improvisation." Ginzburg v. United States, supra at 495 (Harlan
dissenting). A further indication of the limited effect which the Court sought to give
the defendant's conduct is found in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's and Mr. Justice Clark's
dissent in Jacobelis (both justices were part of the Ginzburg majority). After observ-
ing that the defendant's conduct should be pertinent, they continued: "the advertise-
ments published to induce the public to view the motion picture provide some evidence
of the film's dominant theme .... " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 n.2 (1964)
(Warren dissenting). (Emphasis added.)
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B. Private Correspondence and the Definition of Obscenity
From the time of the Roth decision until the 1966 case of Red-
mond v. United States,16 the Supreme Court had not heard argument
on a case involving private correspondence. 16 Due to the fact that
Redmond was decided per curiam on other grounds,'0 5 the Court
has yet to apply the constitutional definition of obscenity in a private
correspondence case.
Employing the test of obscenity, as most recently expounded in
Memoirs, it is manifest that the prurient appeal element may find
full application to allegedly obscene correspondence. Admittedly,
the element of "utterly lacking in redeeming social value" would
also include the type of correspondence usually prosecuted. If these
were the only necessary findings-that the material appeals to the
prurient interest of the recipient, and is utterly without redeeming
social value-most allegedly obscene private letters could be consti-
163 384 U.S. 264 (1966), reversing 355 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1966).
164 The Court did, however, refuse to hear such a case. Cain v. United States,
274 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960), where the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction under § 1461.
165 The defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Redmond, had been convicted of violating
18 U.S.C. § 1461 by sending photographs of themselves, in the nude, to a correspon-
dence club to be developed. Subsequently, United States postal inspectors raided the
dub, seized its membership list, and found thereon the Redmonds' names. The husband
was sentenced to nine months and the wife to six months in prison.
The Redmonds appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the obscenity statute
was "directed solely at those engaged in the dissemination of obscenity to others."
To apply it to private recipients, who "obviously outnumbered commercial dis-
seminators many times over," would present enormous enforcement problems. Ap-
parently the Justice Department had been aware of this enforcement problem. In
1964, prior to the Redmond case, the Department had sent a memo to all U.S.
attorneys stating that private correspondence should be ignored in enforcement of
18 U.S.C. § 1461, except in "aggravated" cases. Consequently, the Solicitor General asked
that the judgment of the court of appeals be vacated, and the cause be remanded to
the district court with directions to dismiss the information. In its per curiam opinion,
the Court cited the request of the Justice Department and also cited a case for the
proposition that the Supreme Court will not decide a constitutional issue when it is
not absolutely necessary to do so. In a concurring statement, Justices Stewart, Black,
and Douglas stated that they "would reverse this conviction, not because it violates
the policy of the Justice Department, but because it violates the Constitution." Red.
mond v. United States, 384 U.S. at 265.
The case cited by the Court was Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), in
which a similar motion for remand was granted in a case concerning double jeopardy.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, in a
separate opinion concurred with the reversal of the judgment, but would have reversed
on the merits. Mr. Justice Brennan's words would seem equally applicable to the
Redmond case. "I do not see how our duty can be fully performed in this case if our
action stops with simply giving effect to a 'policy' of the Government . . . .Even
where the Government confesses error, this Court examines the case on the merits
itself .. . and one would not have thought our duty less in this case-particularly
where the Government has reserved the right to apply or not apply its 'policy' in its
discretion." Petite v. United States, supra at 533. (Citations omitted.)
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tutionally suppressed. However, we have seen that Manual Enterprises
requires that the material be patently offensive and affront the con-
temporary community standards in regard to the description or rep-
resentation of sexual matters.
It is improbable that the Court would add this element of public
affront unless it was concerned with the indiscriminately disseminated
commercial obscenity which is displayed before the community at
large in drugstores, hotel lobbies and bus stations, thereby becoming
offensive to the community. This is further borne out by the general
history of obscenity law, in which the crime of obscenity began as
an affront to the public. By their very nature, private letters between
consenting adults do not affront the public because they are not
exposed to the community. One of the principal reasons for sending
a letter through first-class mail is to render it private and separate
from the view of the public. It is reasonable to apply a test involving
community standards to actions with which the public is confronted,
but it is not reasonable to extend such a standard to a means of com-
munication which is theoretically supposed to be as much protected
from scrutiny as the private conversation between two people. As
confirmation of this idea, Mr. Justice Holmes once eloquently stated
that:
The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but
while it carries it on[,] the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of .free speech as the right to use our tongues .... 166
Thus, if the same standard of public offensiveness is applied to
private correspondence between consenting adults, private letters as
a class would seem to be excluded from the intended scope of the
obscenity statute.
C. Private Letters and the Poliey of Obscenity Law
Although the early history of obscenity law which came from
England seemed to be an attempt to protect public morals, it is
equally apparent that the congressional intent behind American
obscenity statutes is to curtail pornography due to its suspected
causal relationship to crime and juvenile delinquency. 67 That this
166 Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (dissenting
opinion).
167 Since 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is a criminal statute, it should be strictly confined in
its interpretation, and apply only to that conduct which it was strictly intended to
correct. A comprehensive reading of the reports and debates incident to the various
bills would lead one to conclude that Congress intended in particular to circumscribe
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policy has been followed in spirit by the Supreme Court is evident
from a perusal of Roth and the most recent cases.
The Supreme Court in Roth made it clear that it intended only
a narrow interpretation of the obscenity law. Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinion for the majority evidenced the caution with which the Court
ventured into the area of restricting "speech":
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed
greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and
are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the
watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the states.
The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be
left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the
slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more im-
portant interests. 168
In concurring with the result, Mr. Chief Justice Warren demonstrated
even greater caution and emphasized the limitations which should
be imposed on the Court's decision:
I would limit our decision to the facts before us and to the validity
of the statutes in question as applied. . . . The defendants in both
these cases were engaged in the business of purveying textual or
graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of
their customers. They were plainly engaged in the commercial ex-
ploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with
prurient effect. I believe that State and Federal Governments can
constitutionally punish such conduct. That is all that these cases
present to us, and that is all that we need to decide.' 0 9
It is worthy of note that Mr. Justice Harlan concurring as to one
petitioner and dissenting as to the other, was disconcerted with what
he considered to be too much freedom given to the federal govern-
ment in the prosecution of the obscenity statute:
[T]he opinion paints with such a broad brush that I fear it may
"trafficking" or "business" in pornographic material, especially with respect to the
rising juvenile delinquency problem. The most recent confirmation of this congres-
sional intent is contained in the House reports accompanying the most recent amend-
ment to the obscenity law. For example, one House report stated that, "Trafficking in
obscene literature has been conclusively shown to be a corruptive force contributing
to juvenile delinquency." H.R. REP. No. 690, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The
report recommends changes in the law, and quotes for the basis of its recommenda-
tions a statement from the Department of Justice that the revision of the law is
needed because a "void in the law is taken advantage of by those whose business
it is to deal in pornographic and licentious material." H.R. REP. No. 690, supra. See
also S. REp. No. 133, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
168 354 U.S. at 488. (Footnotes omitted.)
169 Id. at 494-96. (Emphasis added.)
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result in a loosening of the tight reins which state and federal
courts should hold upon the enforcement of obscenity statutes....
[I]n no event do I think that the limited federal interest in this
area can extend to mere "thoughts." The Federal Government has
no business whether under the postal or commerce power, to
bar the sale of books because they might lead to any kind of
"thoughts."i"0
The opinion by Mr. Justice Warren in Roth was relied on by the
Court in Ginzburg v. United States.17 ' Despite the wide division of
the Court in this case, at least two factors of particular importance
can be gleaned from the majority opinion. First, the Court voiced
concern with indiscriminate distribution of the obscene material. Thus
it may be inferred that a similar factual situation involving discrim-
inate distribution would give rise to greater hesitation, and perhaps
judicial reluctance, to affirm a lower court conviction. Second, the
overt concern with the commercial nature of the objectionable ma-
terial resulted in the finding that defendants were involved in
"pandering" which leads to a similar inference that the lack of
commercialism in any suspected material would be a weighty factor
in future decisions. That the question of whether the material was
obscene was so enveloped by a consideration of, and ultimately a
reliance upon, the pandering aspects of the distribution, lends sup-
port to the general policy of the legislature's intent. The Court's
finding-that the "titillating" advertisements by the defendant con-
stituted pandering, all of which evidenced the utter commercialism
and exploitation of sexual tensions, thereby accomplishing the very
evil which the statute was designed to prohibit-should serve as
additional support.
Further evidence of the Court's recognition of the commercialism
element may be derived from the fact that in Roth the Court cited
with approval the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code defi-
nition of obscenity. 2 The comments to this section of the model
code are as follows:
Psychiatrists and anthropologists see the ordinary person in our
society as caught between normal sex drives and curiosity on the
one hand, and powerful social and legal prohibitions against overt
sexual behavior. The principal objective of [the proposed section]
is to prevent commercial exploitation of this psychosexual tension.
170 Ibid. at 496. (Footnote omitted.)
171 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
172 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 251A(2) and (4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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... Society may legitimately seek to deter the deliberate stimulation
and exploitation of emotional tensions arising from the conflict
between social convention and an individual's sex drive. .. . The
gist of the offense we envisage, therefore, is a kind of [commercial]
pandering.173
The Ginzburg decision has clearly adopted this philosophy. In order
to prosecute these so-called panderers, the Court was willing to create
a new rule by which material that was not obscene under the Roth
test could become obscene under the statute as a result of the actions
and motives of the publisher. Such a policy, directed as it is at the
public exposure of certain material, cannot logically be extended to
an area which is cloaked in privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
This note has emphasized particular factors as forming the under-
lying basis of obscenity legislation. However, it would be unwise to
assert that these factors constitute an exclusive list, since legislative
intent, particularly in the realm of obscenity, is often quite illusive.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that obscenity legislation has emerged
from its religious and moralistic origins, and has become justifiable
on the functional grounds of the alleged connection between ob-
scenity, juvenile delinquency and crime. Similarly characteristic of
the development of obscenity legislation has been the concern with
commercial exploitation and indiscriminate public dissemination,
both of which, by their very nature, may constitute a nuisance or
affront to the general public.
As has been pointed out, the early cases dealt with the problem of
whether private letters were within the obscenity statutes, and if so,
what kind of letters came within the subjective Hicklin rule. With
the Levine case, the subjective test for obscenity was replaced by the
"average man" test. However, the confusion and difficulty in ad-
ministering this test prompted the courts to revert to applying the
"conditional privilege" doctrine, thereby avoiding the injustices of
the "average man" standard.
With the Roth decision the Court set up the only standard which
could be constitutionally applied in federal obscenity prosecutions.
Thus, obscenity standards appeared to coalesce. It has been argued
in this note that the class of letters containing no obscene language




but rather soliciting "immoral" conduct would not come under the
Roth standard, and in any event, should not be prosecuted for policy
reasons. Since filthy letters were shown not to be a separate class of
nonmailable matter, they too must be shown to be obscene under
Roth in order to sustain a conviction. The Roth case, and the later
cases expanding the Roth "test," Ginzburg, Mishkin, and Memoirs,
gave emphasis to the circumstances of commercial exploitation and
indiscriminate dissemination to youth. This note has pointed up the
importance of those factors, and has shown that the modified Roth
test is unacceptable as applied to private letters between consenting
adults, because private letters do not fit the elements of being public,
commercial, and detrimental to youth.
It is arguable that in view of the result of the Redmond case the
problem has been solved, but in reality the Court sidestepped an op-
portunity to speak on the question by enforcing the government's
"policy" in this matter. This means little since government policy may
change from day to day. Therefore, there continues to exist a problem
which demands a solution. In the event that the Court is confronted
with a private letter case, section 1461 will probably be found not
to have constitutional application to private letters. Such a result
would be a logical culmination of the Court's trend in this direction.
This conclusion is further buttressed by the Court's continued cogni-
zance of the Model Penal Code, which specifically excludes private
noncommercial correspondence from criminal prosecution.
However, to allow the issue to lie dormant until another private
letter case comes before the Supreme Court, is really no solution at
all. A real solution would be to amend section 1461 in accordance
with the exemplary Model Penal Code. If allegedly obscene letters
are sent through first-class mail between consenting adults, it should
be provided as a defense to a prosecution under section 1461 that the
letter was noncommercial in nature, and that it was sent to personal
associates. Although this solution is little more than a positive en-
actment of what is supposedly the government's policy of not prose-
cuting obscene-letter senders except in aggravated cases, it is a
necessary amendment. If enacted, such a defense would preclude
prosecutions typified by the Redmond case, and would spare the
accused much unwarranted expense and humiliation.
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